We study the problem of multi-dimensional revenue maximization when selling m items to a buyer that has additive valuations for them, drawn from a (possibly correlated) prior distribution. Unlike traditional Bayesian auction design, we assume that the seller has a very restricted knowledge of this prior: they only know the mean µ j and an upper bound σ j on the standard deviation of each item's marginal distribution. Our goal is to design mechanisms that achieve good revenue against an ideal optimal auction that has full knowledge of the distribution in advance. Informally, our main contribution is a tight quantification of the interplay between the dispersity of the priors and the aforementioned robust approximation ratio. Furthermore, this can be achieved by very simple selling mechanisms.
Introduction
Optimal auction design is one of the most well-studied and fundamental problems in (algorithmic) mechanism design. In the traditional Myersonian [45] setting, an auctioneer has a single item for sale and there are n interested bidders. Each bidder has a (private) valuation for the item which, intuitively, represents the amount of money they are willing to spend to buy it. The standard Bayesian approach is to assume that the seller has only an incomplete knowledge of these valuations, in the form of a prior joint distribution F . A selling mechanism receives bids from the buyers and then decides to whom the item should be allocated (which, in general, can be a randomized rule) and for what price. The goal is to design a truthful 1 selling mechanism that maximizes the auctioneer's revenue, in expectation over F .
Myerson [45] provided a complete and very elegant solution for this problem when bidder valuations are independent, that is, F is a product distribution. In particular, when the distributions are identical and further satisfy a regularity assumption, the optimal mechanism takes the very satisfying form of a second-price (Vickrey) auction with a reserve price. Unfortunately, in general these characterizations collapse when we move to multi-dimensional environments where there are m > 1 items for sale. Multi-item optimal auction design is one of the most challenging and currently active research areas of mechanism design. Given that the exact description of the revenue maximizing auctions in such settings is a notoriously hard task, there is an impressive stream of recent papers, predominantly from the algorithmic game theory community, that try to provide good approximation guarantees to the optimal revenue.
The critical common underlying assumption throughout the aforementioned optimal auction design settings is that the seller has full knowledge of the prior joint distribution F of the bidders' valuations. In many applications though, this might arguably be an unrealistic assumption to make: usually an auctioneer can derive some distributional properties about the bidder population, but to completely determine the actual distribution would require enormous resources. Thus, inspired by the parametric auctions of Azar and Micali [1] for the single-dimensional case, we would like to be able to design robust auctions that (1) make only use of minimal statistical information about the valuation distribution, namely its mean and variance; and (2) still provide good revenue guarantees even in the worst case against an adversarial selection of the actual distribution F ; in particular, no further assumptions (e.g., independence of item valuations or regularity) should in general be made about F . This is our main goal in this paper.
Related Work
As mentioned in the introduction, there has been an impressive stream of recent work on optimal [12, 23, 25, 29, 39] and approximately-optimal [4, 11, 15, 31, 36, 48, 49, 54] multidimensional auction design, which tries to extend the traditional, single-dimensional auction setting studied in the seminal paper of Myerson [45] . A prominent characteristic that can often be seen in these papers is the "simplicity vs optimality" approach: knowing the computational hardness [18, 19, 22] and structural complexity [23, 30] of describing exact optimality, emphasis is placed on designing both simple and practical mechanisms that can still provide good revenue guarantees. Of course, this idea can be traced back to the work of Hartline and Roughgarden [33] and Bulow and Klemperer [9] for the single-dimensional setting. For a more thorough overview we refer to the recent review article of Roughgarden and Talgam-Cohen [47] and the textbook of Hartline [32] .
Related to this, and placed under the general theme of what has come to be known as "Wilson's doctrine" [53] (see also [40, Section 5.2] ), there has also been significant effort towards the direction of robust revenue maximization: designing auctions that make as few assumptions as possible on the seller's prior knowledge about the bidders' valuations for the items. Examples include models where the auctioneer has only sample access to the distribution [21, 24, 27, 34, 42, 51] , can perform quantile queries [17] or knows some estimate of the actual prior [6, 10, 37] . Another line of work studies robustness with respect to the correlation of valuations across bidders or items [5, 14, 28] .
Most relevant to our work in the present paper is the model of parametric auctions, introduced by Azar and Micali [1] . More specifically, they study single-dimensional (digital goods and single-item) auction settings with independent item valuations, under the assumption that the seller has only access to the mean µ i and the variance σ 2 i of each buyer's i prior distribution. Using Chebyshev-like tail bounds, they show that for the special single-bidder, single-item case, deterministically pricing at a multiple of the standard deviation below the mean, i.e. offering a take-it-or-leave-it price of µ − k · σ, guarantees an approximation ratio ofρ(σ/µ), whereρ is an increasing function taking values in [1, ∞) . In Appendix C, we actually quantify this bound and show that it grows quadratically. Under an extra assumption of Monotone Hazard Rate (MHR), they show how the even simpler selling mechanism that just prices at µ achieves an approximation ratio of e.
It is interesting to notice here that Azar and Micali [1] provide an exact solution, for deterministic mechanisms, to the robust optimization problem of maximizing the expected revenue. Then, they use this maximin revenue-optimal mechanism and compare it to the optimal social welfare (which is trivially also an upper bound on the optimal revenue), to finally derive their upper bound guarantee on the approximation ratio of revenue. As such, their results are not tailored to be tight for the ratio benchmark. As a matter of fact, in [3] the authors also provide an explicit lower bound that can be written as 1 + r 2 . This is an important motivating factor for our work, since one of our main goals in this paper is to close these gaps and provide tight approximation ratio bounds.
Azar et al. [2] use a clever reduction (see also the work of Chawla et al. [16] ) to show how these results can be paired with the work of Dhangwatnotai et al. [24] regarding the VCG mechanism with reserves, in order to design parametric auctions for very general single-dimensional settings. In particular, they show how in matroid-constrained environments with the extra assumption of regularity on the prior distributions (or MHR for more general downward-closed environments), using the aforementioned parametric prices as lazy reserves guarantees a 2ρ(r)-approximation to the optimal (Myersonian) revenue and aρ(r)-approximation to the optimal social welfare.
Another work which is close to ours is that of Carrasco et al. [13] . The authors essentially extend the model of Azar and Micali [1] to randomized mechanisms, solving the maximin robust optimization problem with respect to revenue. Again, in principle their results cannot be immediately translated to tight bounds for the approximation ratio; however, unlike the deterministic case for which in the present paper we have to design a new mechanism in order to achieve ratio optimality, we will show that the maximin optimal lottery of Carrasco et al. [13] is actually also optimal for the ratio benchmark.
Results and Techniques
The main focus of our paper is a multi-dimensional auction setting where a single bidder has additive valuations for m items, drawn from a joint probability distribution F . We make no further assumptions on F ; in particular, we do not require F to be a product distribution nor do we enforce any kind of regularity. The seller knows only the mean µ j and (an upper bound on) the standard deviation σ j of each item's j marginal distribution. Based on this limited statistical information, they are asked to fix a truthful (possibly randomized) mechanism to sell the items. Then, an adversary chooses the actual distribution F (respecting, of course, the statistical (µ j , σ j )-information) and the seller realizes the expected revenue of the auction, in the standard Bayesian way, in expectation with respect to F . The main quantity of interest, which we call the robust approximation ratio is the ratio of the optimal revenue (which has full knowledge of F in advance) to this revenue.
Our worst-case, min-max approach is similar in spirit to the previous work of Azar et al. [2] , Azar and Micali [3] and Carrasco et al. [13] . However, the critical difference in the present paper is that our main goal is to optimize the ratio against the optimal revenue and not just the expected revenue of the selling mechanism on its own. It turns out that, similarly to the aforementioned previous work, our bounds can be stated with respect to the ratio r j = σ j /µ j , which is an important statistical quantity called the coefficient of variation 2 (CV), of each item's marginal distribution.
In Section 2 we formally introduce our model and necessary notation. In the following two sections we focus on the single-item case, since this will be the building block for all our results. In particular, in Section 3 we show that the robust approximation ratio of deterministic mechanisms is exactly ρ D (r) ≈ 1 + 4r 2 (see Definition 1), closing a gap open from the work of Azar and Micali [3] . Similarly to previous work, in order to achieve this we solve exactly the corresponding min-max problem (see Lemma 2) ; however, the method and the solution itself have to be different, since we are dealing with the ratio, which is a more "sensitive" quantity than the revenue on its own.
Next, in Section 4 we deal with general randomized auctions and we show (Theorem 2) that a lottery proposed by Carrasco et al. [13] , which we term log-lottery, although designed for a different objective, achieves an approximation ratio of ρ(r) ≈ 1 + ln(1 + r 2 ) (see Definition 1) in our setting, which is asymptotically optimal. The construction of the lower bound instance (Theorem 3) is arguably the most technically challenging part of our paper, and is based on a novel utilization of Yao's minimax principle (see also Appendix D) that might be of independent interest for deriving robust approximation lower bounds in other Bayesian mechanism design settings as well. Informally, the adversary offers a distribution over two-point mass distributions, finely-tuned such that the resulting mixture becomes a truncated "equal-revenue style" distribution (see Fig. 2c ).
Is is important to restate that we work under the assumption that we know an upper bound on the standard-deviation σ and not its exact value. Although this makes our upper bounds more powerful, it is not a source of "artificial" additional power for the adversary when designing our lower bounds. We formalize this in Lemma 5. Furthermore, this helps us to formally demonstrate (see Proposition 2) that our aforementioned, Yao-based, lower bound construction lies at the "border of simplicity" of any non-trivial lower bound.
In Section 5 we demonstrate how the O(log r)-approximate mechanism of the single-item case can be utilized to provide optimal approximation ratios for the multi-dimensional case of m items as well. More specifically, we show that selling each item j separately using the log-lottery guarantees an approximation ratio of ρ(r max ) where r max = max j r j is the maximum CV across the items. If the seller has extra information that item valuations are independent (that is, F is a product distribution), then switching to a lottery that offers all items in a single full bundle can give an improved approximation ratio of ρ(r), wherer = j σ 2 j / j µ j is the CV of the average valuation. We complement these upper bounds by tight lower bounds in Theorem 5; these constructions have at their core the single-item lower bound, but they take care of delicately assigning valuations to the remaining items so that they respect independence and the common prior statistical information. An interesting corollary of our upper bounds (Corollary 1) is that for the special case of independent valuations with the same mean and variance, the approximation ratio is at most ρ σ µ √ m , converging to optimality as the number of items grows large.
In Section 6.1 we diverge from our main model to discuss some additional "peripheral" results that can be deduced as direct corollaries of previous work combined with our upper bounds, in a "black-box" way. First, we study the single-dimensional, multi-bidder setting of parametric auctions introduced by Azar and Micali [3] . More specifically, we show how the positive results derived in Azar et al. [2, Theorem 4.3] can be further improved: running VCG with lazy reserve prices drawn from the log-lottery guarantees a 2ρ(r) approximation to the optimal Myersonian revenue (Corollary 2).
Secondly, in Section 6.2 we discuss how a relaxation of our model that only assumes knowledge of the mean (that is, without any information about the variance σ 2 ) can still produce good robust approximation ratios under an extra regularity assumption. More precisely, in Proposition 3 we give an upper bound on the approximation ratio of the mechanism that just offers the mean µ as a take-it-or-leave-it price, under the extra assumption that the item's valuation distribution is λ-regular (see Fig. 3a) ; this is a general notion of regularity that interpolates smoothly between regularity à la Myerson (λ = 1) and the Monotone Hazard Rate (MHR) condition (λ = 0); see, e.g., [26, 50] . This result extends the e-approximation for MHR distributions of Azar and Micali [1, Theorem 3] . In Section 6.2 we provide a more detailed characterization of the relationship between the knowledge of λ-regularity and knowledge of σ, with respect to the resulting robust approximation ratio upper bound (see Fig. 3b ).
Preliminaries

Model and Notation
A real nonnegative random variable will be called (µ, σ)-distributed if its expectation is µ and its standard deviation is at most σ. We let F µ,σ denote the class of (µ, σ) distributions. We shall also briefly (see Lemma 5) discuss the restriction to distributions with standard deviation of exactly σ; this subclass will be denoted by F = µ,σ . For the most part of this paper we study auctions with m items and a single additive bidder, whose valuations (v 1 , . . . , v m ) for the items are drawn from a joint distribution F over R m ≥0 . We denote the marginal distribution of v j by F j , and assume that it has finite mean and variance. In general, we make no further assumptions for F ; in particular, we do not assume independence of the random variables v 1 , . . . , v m nor do we enforce any regularity or continuity assumption.
A (direct revelation, possibly randomized) selling mechanism for a single bidder and m items is defined by a pair (x, π) where x : R m ≥0 → [0, 1] m is the allocation rule and π : R m ≥0 → R ≥0 is the payment rule. If the buyer submits as bid a valuation vector of v, then they receive each item i with probability x i ( v), and are charged (a total of) π( v). We restrict our study to truthful mechanisms, which are characterized by the conditions
Informally, the first condition states that the bidder can not be "better off" by misreporting their true valuation; the second condition, known as individual rationality, ensures that the bidder cannot harm themselves by truthfully participating in the mechanism. Let A m denote the space of all truthful selling mechanisms. Then, given an m-dimensional distribution F , we denote by
, the expected revenue of A (the expectation is taken w.r.t. F );
• OPT(F ) = sup A∈Am REV(A; F ), the optimum revenue;
• VAL(F ) = sup A∈Am WEL(A; F ), the optimum welfare. By definition, this is also the welfare of a VCG auction; moreover, for a single additive bidder with a joint distribution in F µ, σ , this is just the sum of the marginal expectations, VAL(F ) = m j=1 µ j .
Note that, due to (2), we immediately have the so-called welfare bounds for the above quantities: for any mechanism and distribution, REV(A; F ) ≤ WEL(A; F ) and OPT(F ) ≤ VAL(F ).
Our goal in this paper is to quantify the following benchmark
which we call the robust approximation ratio. The semantics are the following: a seller chooses the best (revenue-maximizing) selling mechanism A, given only knowledge of the means µ and standard deviations σ and then an adversary ("nature") responds by choosing a worst-case "valid" distribution that respects the statistical information µ and σ. At some parts of our paper, we restrict our attention to deterministic mechanisms A; that is, mechanisms whose allocation rule satisfies x( v) ∈ {0, 1}, for all v. Under this additional constraint, the quantity in (3) will be denoted by DAPX( µ, σ).
For the special case of a single item (m = 1), we know from the seminal work of Myerson [45] that an auction A ∈ A 1 is truthful if and only if its allocation rule is monotone nondecreasing and the payment rule is given by
In particular, this implies that every deterministic mechanism A ∈ A 1 is completely determined by a single take-it-or-leave-it price p ≥ 0; thus, we will feel free to sometimes abuse notation and write REV(p; F ) instead of REV(A; F ) if A is the deterministic auction that sells at price p.
Most importantly for our work, every randomized auction for a single item can be seen as a nonnegative random variable over prices (see Carrasco et al. [13, Footnote 10] ). In particular, since the allocation rule is monotone and takes values in [0, 1], it can be interpreted as the cumulative distribution of a certain randomization over prices, which assigns the item with the same probability as the original mechanism. 3 In this way, for a randomized single-item auction we can abuse notation and write p ∼ A to denote that a price p is sampled according to A. In this way, REV(A;
Finally, from Myerson [45] we also know that for single-item settings the optimum revenue can always be achieved by a deterministic mechanism, that is,
where we use F (·) for the cumulative function (cdf) of distribution F and
, where X ∼ F . We shall call OPT(·) the Myerson operator and for now we simply observe that this is a functional mapping distributions to real nonnegative numbers.
Auxiliary Functions and Distributions
To state our bounds, it will be convenient to define the following auxiliary functions: 
Definition 1 (Functions
Plots of these functions, for small values of r, can be seen in Fig. 1 . Their asymptotic behaviour is given in the following two lemmas, whose proofs are deferred to Appendix A.
Lemma 1. For the functions ρ D , ρ defined in Definition 1, we have the bounds and asymptotics,
We also define a specific random variable, which corresponds to the prices of the lottery proposed by Carrasco et al. [13, Prop. 4 
]:
Definition 2 (Log-Lottery). Fix any µ > 0 and σ ≥ 0. A log-lottery, denoted by P log µ,σ , is a random variable distributed over the nonnegative interval support [π 1 , π 2 ] according to the cdf
where parameters π 1 , π 2 are the (unique) solutions of the system
(5b)
Single Item: Deterministic Pricing
In this section we begin our study of robust revenue maximization by looking at the simplest case: one item and deterministic pricing rules. Note that Azar and Micali [3] already established a lower bound of 1 + r 2 for this setting, together with an upper bound which can be shown to be 1 + 27 4 + o(1) r 2 (they actually characterized the upper bound via the solution of a cubic equation; we provide the exact asymptotics of that solution in Appendix C). Our result (Theorem 1) is a refined analysis that captures the exact robustness ratio (and in particular the "correct" constant in the quadratic term). Our first observation (Lemma 2) will be that the worst-case adversarial response (for a specific selling price) can be characterized in terms of a two-point mass distribution, which allows the problem to be solved exactly. These type of distributions have appeared already in the results of Azar and Micali [1] and Carrasco et al. [13] , and we will start by introducing some notation to reason about them.
A two-point mass distribution F takes some value x with probability α and some value y with probability 1 − α, where without loss x < y. When the distribution is constrained to have mean µ and variance exactly equal to σ 2 , only one free parameter remains, i.e. F can be characterized by the position x of its first point mass. The other two parameters can be obtained as
by solving the first and second moment conditions µ = αx+(1−α)y and µ 2 +σ 2 = αx 2 +(1−α)y 2 .
For the remainder, we let F x , x ∈ [0, µ), denote this distribution. Note that the limiting case x → µ corresponds to α(x) → 1 and y(x) → ∞, meaning that F x weakly converges to µ. The next result solves the innermost optimization problem in (3), i.e. it characterizes the worst-case adversarial response against a specific deterministic pricing.
Lemma 2. For any choice of mean µ and variance σ 2 , and any deterministic pricing scheme, the worst-case robust approximation ratio is achieved over a limiting two-point mass distribution. Formally, for any µ, σ, p,
if p > µ, then the worst-case response corresponds to playing F x with x → µ − , and
2. if 0 < p < µ, then the worst-case response corresponds to playing F x with x → p − , and
Proof. If p > µ, then the worst-case robust approximation ratio can become arbitrarily large by taking x → µ − , that is, x arbitrarily close to µ, so that α(x) → 1. Indeed, we have that
so that the supremum of the ratio is unbounded. Next, let us suppose that 0 < p < µ. First, we compute the limit of the approximation ratio for distribution F x , as x → p − . Observe that OPT(F x ) = max{x, (1 − α(x))y(x)}; and since x < p, we sell the item with probability 1 − α(x), to obtain REV(p;
Thus, it only remains to show that for any random variable X drawn from a (µ, σ) distribution F , we have that
We first derive a lower bound on the probability of selling the item at price p via a one-sided version of Chebyshev's inequality, also called Cantelli's inequality 4 (see, e.g., [8, p. 46] 
Let p * denote the optimal take-it-or-leave-it price for distribution F , so that OPT(F ) = p * Pr[x ≥ p * ]. Again, we consider two cases: if p * ≤ p, then we have
where in the first inequality we used (6) and the bounds p
Next, consider the case p * > p. By looking at the conditional random variable (X|X ≥ p), we observe that
the inequality holds because the social welfare is always an upper bound to the revenue. In order to bound the conditional expectation, we use a result in Mallows and Richter [38, Eq. (1.2)]. It states that if X is a real-valued random variable with mean µ and variance σ 2 and E is a non-zero probability event, then
Pr [E] .
In our case, we use E = (X ≥ p), together with the lower bound in (6), to get
Finally, combining the above with (7) yields
which concludes the proof.
Theorem 1. The deterministic robust approximation ratio of selling a single
where r = σ/µ and function ρ D (·) is given in Definition 1. In particular, this is achieved by offering a take-it-or-leave-it price of p =
2ρ D (r)−1 · µ. 4 Although the original statement of Cantelli's inequality is for a random variable with variance equal to σ 2 , by monotonicity the same holds if σ 2 is instead an upper bound on the variance.
Proof. For fixed µ and σ, Lemma 2 gives the worst-case approximation ratio for any choice of p. Thus, from the seller's perspective, it is clear that one should offer a price below the mean, and furthermore the outermost optimization problem reduces to finding
.
In Lemma 6 (see Appendix A), we prove that this quantity is minimized when both branches coincide; that it corresponds to the unique positive solution of the equation
the desired asymptotics; and also the characterization of the selling price p in terms of ρ.
Single Item: Lotteries
In this section, we continue to focus on a single-item setting, but now we study the robust approximation ratio that can be achieved by a randomized mechanism, i.e. by randomizing over posted prices. Carrasco et al. [13] have given the explicit solution to the robust absolute revenue problem, sup
We state below a proposition that can be directly derived from their work and which would be very useful for our setting (the detailed derivation can be found in Appendix B)
where π 1 is derived by the unique solution of the system (5a)-(5b). Moreover, this value is achieved by the log-lottery P log µ,σ described in Definition 2. The above characterization can be directly used to derive a logarithmic upper bound on the robust approximation ratio:
Theorem 2. The robust approximation ratio of selling a single
where r = σ/µ and function ρ is given in Definition 1. In particular, this is achieved by the log-lottery described in Definition 2.
Proof. By Proposition 1, if A is the log-lottery from Definition 2, then for any (µ, σ) distribution F we have that REV(A; F ) ≥ π 1 . Thus, using the trivial upper bound of OPT(F ) ≤ µ for the optimal revenue, we can derive an upper bound of
on the approximation ratio. For convenience, let us denote this by ρ ≡ µ/π 1 .
Manipulating (5a) we get
and so from (5b) we can derive
which is exactly the equation in Definition 1. The asymptotic behaviour follows from Lemma 1.
By looking at the proof of the previous theorem, it is not difficult to see that our upper bound is also an upper bound with respect to welfare (which for a single (µ, σ) distribution is simply given by µ). If we were interested in comparing the revenue of our auction to the maximum welfare, then it immediately follows from Proposition 1 that the bound is exact and tight. However, our main goal in the present paper is to provide tight bounds with respect to the optimal revenue, and achieving this requires some extra work. The rest of our section is devoted to proving and discussing the following lower bound, which asymptotically matches that of Theorem 2.
Theorem 3. For a single (µ, σ)-distributed item, the robust approximation ratio is at least
where r = σ/µ.
Before we go into the actual construction of our lower bound instances, we need some technical preliminaries and to recall Yao's principle (see, e.g., [7, Sec. 8.3] 
As we already mentioned (see Section 2.1), a randomized mechanism A ∈ A 1 can be interpreted as a randomization over prices p ∼ A. From (3), we are interested in the value of a game in which the mechanism designer plays first, randomizing over posted prices, and the adversary plays second, choosing a worst-case distribution. Intuitively, Yao's principle states that this is at least the value of another game in which the adversary plays first, randomizing over their choices, and the mechanism designer plays second, choosing a deterministic response, i.e. a single posted price.
However, to define this second game formally, we would have to first explain what it means for the adversary to randomize over probability distributions, which form an infinite-dimensional space. Informally, this corresponds to a space of "distributions over distributions"; but in order to avoid technical or measure-theoretical issues, we focus on a specific model of randomization, which in the literature gives rise to the concept of mixture or contagious distribution (see, e.g.,Mood et al. [41, Ch. III.4] . Definition 3. Let F be a class of cumulative distribution functions over the nonnegative reals, and consider any measure space over a ground set T . By an F-mixture with parameter space T , we mean a pair (Θ, F ), where Θ is a probability measure in T , and F is a measurable function of type F : R ≥0 × T → R, whose sections are in F; i.e. for any parameter θ ∈ T , the function
is a cumulative distribution in F.
Given an F-mixture (Θ, F ), we denote its posterior distribution by E θ∼Θ [F θ ]; this is specified by the cdf
When F = F µ,σ is the class of (µ, σ) distributions, we shall let ∆ µ,σ denote the class of (µ, σ) mixtures, that is, the class of mixtures over F µ,σ (with arbitrary, unspecified parameter space). We can interpret (Θ, F ) as a convex combination of distributions, so that the cdf of E θ∼Θ [F θ ] is the convex combination of the corresponding cdfs; alternatively, E θ∼Θ [F ] can be seen as the cdf of a random variable that first samples a distribution F θ according to θ ∼ Θ, and then samples a value z according to F θ . Now that we have carefully described the adversarial model, we can formally state a version of Yao's principle (Lemma 3 below) that will help us prove lower bounds. Since this applies on "non-standard" continuous spaces, for completeness we need to formally derive it "from scratch"; we give such a self-contained proof in Appendix D.
Lemma 3. For any µ, σ, we have the following lower bound on the robust approximation ratio,
Note that, by using (4), we can rewrite the denominator of the previous quantity as follows:
The second equality comes from linearity of expectation and the third one follows from the definition of a mixture distribution. Putting all these together, we arrive at the following key technical result:
Lemma 4. For any µ, σ, the robust approximation ratio is lower bounded by
From a practical perspective, the above result has a positive consequence. It allows us to obtain lower bounds by constructing a single (µ, σ) mixture, (Θ, F ), and calculating the expected optimal revenue before and after the realization of θ ∼ Θ. From a theoretical perspective, the quantity in (9) is interesting by itself. One can check that the Myerson operator is convex, that is, the revenue achieved by a convex combination of distributions can only be smaller than the convex combinations of the corresponding revenues. Thus, by Jensen's inequality, the ratio in (9) is always at least 1. On the other hand, for a linear functional L, we have that
. Thus, (9) somehow attempts to quantify the extent to which OPT is nonlinear, or in other words, it can be understood as a measure of convexity of the Myerson operator. In any case, we can use this result to construct lower bound instances and prove the main result of this section:
Proof of Theorem 3. We shall construct a (µ, σ) mixture over two-point mass distributions. Each two-point mass distribution F ε is given by a unique choice of parameter ε ∈ (0, 1]; F ε returns 0 with probability 1 − ε and µ/ε with probability ε. Note that F ε has mean µ and variance µ 2 (1/ε − 1). The upper bound of σ 2 on the variance implies that we can only take values of ε ≥ ε 0 ≡ 1 1+r 2 , where r is the coefficient of variation (our quantity of interest). Our next step is to describe the convex mixture of these distributions. Define a random variable with [ε 0 , 1] and distributed according to B as follows:
• B has a point mass at ε 0 of size c; and is chosen as a normalizing constant; indeed,
Our (µ, σ) mixture distribution thus corresponds to sampling F ε where ε ∼ B. Next, we describe the posterior distribution G = E ε∼B [F ε ]. Its cumulative function can be seen in Fig. 2c . • Mass at 0: as each F ε has a point mass at 0, so does G. The value of this mass is given by
• Mass at µ/ε 0 : as B has a point mass at ε 0 and F ε 0 has a point mass at µ/ε 0 , this implies that G has a point mass at µ/ε 0 of size cε 0 ;
for ε < µ/z and 1 for ε ≥ µ/z; thus the cdf of G can be computed as . On the other hand, note that for every ε > 0 we have OPT(F ε ) = µ, so E ε∼B [OPT(F ε )] = µ. Plugging these into (9) yields a lower bound of 1/c = 1 + ln(1 + r 2 ) as desired.
We can interpret G(z) as a truncated equal-revenue
From the previous proof, some further discussion and remarks are in order. Note that our mixture uses distributions F ε , which for ε > ε 0 have a variance strictly smaller than σ 2 . Since we have defined our adversarial model to play (µ, σ) distributions, such instances are allowed. However, one may wish to ensure that the adversary only picks distributions in F = µ,σ (i.e. with exact equality on the variance); this might be relevant, for example, if the seller had extra information about the exact value of σ; or, from a theoretical perspective, such a restriction of the adversary would only make our lower bound more "clear" and powerful. We shall now argue that indeed our assumption on having just a bound on the standard deviation, is not only a technical convenience (and, arguably, more realistic), but also is without loss of generality for our bounds. Intuitively, for any mechanism A and any (µ, σ) distribution F , one can "perturb" F into a distribution in F = µ,σ having nearly the same approximation ratio. Below we formalize this intuition for single-item settings, although it is not hard to see how to generalize it to higher dimensions.
Lemma 5. For single-item settings, the restriction of the robust approximation problem from (µ, σ) distributions to distributions in F =
µ,σ does not change its value. Formally, for any µ > 0, σ ≥ 0, and any mechanism A, we have
OPT(F ) REV(A; F ) ;
and hence
OPT(F ) REV(A; F ) .
Proof. Let µ and σ be given, and let A be any mechanism and F 0 any (µ, σ) distribution. Suppose that the variance of F 0 isσ 2 < σ 2 . For each δ ∈ (0, 1], let us define the perturbed distribution F δ as the following convex combination of distributions:
• with probability 1 − δ, sample a value according to F 0 ;
• with probability δ, sample a value according to the rare event distribution that is 0 with probability 1 − ε and µ/ε with probability ε;
• the value of ε is chosen so that F δ has variance exactly equal to σ 2 ; in other words, it is obtained by solving the system
Note that, for each δ, F δ has the desired mean of µ as it is the convex combination of two distributions of mean µ. Moreover, as δ → 0, also ε → 0, so that F δ weakly converges to F 0 . Finally, we have the trivial bounds
which can be combined to yield
By letting δ go to 0, we have sup
Taking suprema over F 0 on the right-hand side yields the first statement of our lemma; and taking infima over A on both sides yields the last statement.
It should also be mentioned that, in principle, we could accommodate the proof of Theorem 3 to handle distributions with exact equality with respect to σ, with minor technical modifications. More precisely, one would define F ε,δ as a perturbation of F ε as in the proof of Lemma 5. This would yield an approximation ratio that depends on δ, which would then be taken in the limit δ → 0.
Another observation is that the "bad instances" that we used for Theorem 3 were two-point mass distributions, with one of the points being 0. Note that these differ from the instances we used in the deterministic lower bounds (Lemma 2, Theorem 1), which were two-point mass distributions with exact variance of σ 2 . These latter instances were actually shown in [13] to be worst-case distributions for their objective function, and they were also used in Azar and Micali [3] to prove maximin optimality in their model. Thus, it would be natural to wonder whether such instances could have been actually enough to prove a matching lower bound in the randomized setting. Below we answer this question in the negative; in other words, we prove a constant upper bound when the adversary is forced to pick one of these distributions. Proof. Let us analyse the performance of A on a two-point mass distribution F x , say with a point mass at x of size α(x) and another at y(x) of size 1 − α(x), with x < µ < y(x). If 1 2 µ ≤ x then, as before, the mechanism chooses with probability 1/2 a price that always sells, guaranteeing revenue of 
Proposition 2. For every choice of µ, σ, there is a randomized mechanism
Our mechanism A chooses with probability 1/2 a price of µ+2 σ 2 µ , which sells with probability 1 − α(x). Thus the revenue achieved is at least
so that the mechanism achieves a 1/4-fraction of OPT(F ) in this case as well.
Multiple Items
In this section we finally consider the more general setting of a single additive buyer with valuations for m items. As it turns out, the main tools developed in Section 4 can be leveraged very naturally to produce similar upper and lower bounds. We begin by proving upper bounds for both correlated and independent item valuations.
Theorem 4. The robust approximation ratio of selling m (possibly correlated) ( µ, σ)-distributed items is at most
and function ρ is given in Definition 1. This is achieved by selling each item j separately using the log-lottery P log µ j ,σ j from Definition 2. Furthermore, if the items are independently distributed, the above bound improves to
achieved by selling the items in a single full-bundle using the log-lottery P For our general upper bound first, observe that selling item j using a lottery A j , where A j = P log µ j ,σ j is the log-lottery of Definition 2, guarantees (Theorem 2) a revenue of at least
Thus, if A is the mechanism that sells independently each item j using A j , we can get the following approximation ratio upper bound for our total revenue
where the last inequality holds due to the monotonicity of ρ(·): ρ(r j ) ≤ ρ(r max ) for all j.
For the case of independent valuations, observe that a feasible selling mechanism for our items is to bundle them all together and treat them as a single item, i.e. price their sum of valuations Y . Since Y is (μ,σ)-distributed, offering a log-lottery A = P loḡ µ,σ for Y results in an approximation ratio guarantee of
forr =σ/μ. Finally, to verify that ρ(r) ≤ ρ(r max ), due to the monotonicity of ρ(·) it is enough to see thatr
µ j is a weighted average of r 1 , r 2 , . . . , r m , and thus at most r max .
Corollary 1. The robust approximation revenue of selling m independently
where r = σ/µ, achieved by selling the items in a single full-bundle using the mechanism given in Theorem 2.
Proof. In the proof of Theorem 4, if X 1 , . . . , X m are independent random variables with mean µ and standard deviation at most σ, then for their sum
We make a few observations at this point. Notice that when moving from a single item to many items, our approximation guarantees do not degrade; in particular, the robust approximation ratio is at most that of the "worst" item (i.e. the item with the highest coefficient of variation). In fact, for m independently (µ, σ)-distributed items the approximation ratio even converges to optimality (Corollary 1); this can be seen as a reinterpretation of the known result that full-bundling is asymptotically optimal for an additive bidder and many i.i.d. items (see Hart and Nisan [31, A.5.] ), but in our framework of minimal statistical information.
Although the mechanisms presented in Theorem 4 are extremely simple (lotteries over separate pricing or bundle pricing), we can actually show asymptotically matching lower bounds with for any choice of the coefficients of variation: 
Furthermore, this lower bound is achieved by independent (µ j , σ j )-distributions.
Proof. Let m, r 1 , . . . , r m , ε be as in the statement of the theorem, and without loss assume max j r j = r 1 . Let δ > 0 be chosen such that δ ln(1 + r 2 )(1 + ln(1 + r 2 )) 2 < ε. We shall choose the values for the mean and variance as
The idea is that we create a "bad" instance in which items 2, . . . , m are rare event distributions with very little welfare and so their contribution to the revenue will be negligible. To that end, we must first introduce some notation. For every item j ≥ 2, denote
and for every S ⊆ {2, . . . , n}, i.e. for every subset of the "low" items,
Also, define the event
Next, let A be any m-dimensional truthful mechanism, i.e. a mechanism for selling m items to a single bidder. For each S ⊆ {2, . . . , n}, let A S be the 1-dimensional mechanism induced by event E S ; intuitively, this mechanism allocates according to A with the values v j set as in E S , but discounting the payment by the welfare from items in S. Formally, if A is defined by allocation and payment rules, A = ( x, π), then A S = (x S , π S ) can be defined as
where v −1 = (v 2 , . . . , v m ) and, for j ≥ 2, we have v j = α j if j ∈ S; and v j = 0 if j ∈ S. One can directly check that A S defines a truthful mechanism. Now defineĀ = S p S A S to be the convex combination of mechanisms A S . This can be interpreted as the one-dimensional mechanism that samples a subset S ⊆ {2, . . . , n} with probability p S and then runs mechanism A S . Finally, we apply Theorem 3 that ensures the existence of a "bad" single-item distribution for mechanism A S , i.e. a distribution F 1 with mean µ 1 and standard deviation σ 1 such that
Each of the remaining distributions, F j for j = 2, . . . , m, is a rare event distribution that assigns a mass of p j on value α j , and a mass of 1 − p j on value 0. It is not hard to see that F j has the desired mean of µ j and variance of σ 2 j . To conclude the proof, let F = F 1 × · · · × F m be the product distribution corresponding to item-independent valuations; it only remains to show that OPT(F ) REV(A; F )
We first recall a standard revenue-decomposition inequality (see the proof of Hart and Nisan [31, Lemma 8] ). For any S ⊆ {2, . . . , n}, we know that
By the construction of our two-point mass distributions F j , j ≥ 2, we know that E S form a partition of all possible valuation profiles, each event occurring with probability p S ; in this way, we can sum over the conditional expected revenues,
Next, we consider two cases. If REV(A; F ) ≤ 1 (1+ln(1+r 2 )) 2 , then recall that by the mechanism presented in Theorem 2 one can extract revenue of at least
Hence we can assume that REV(A; F ) ≥ 1 (1+ln(1+r 2 )) 2 . Note that by selling the items separately, and in particular using a price of α j for items j = 2, . . . , m we can lower bound the optimal revenue by
Using this bound, together with the derivation in (11) and the fact that VAL(F 2 ×· · ·×F m ) = δ, yields
as we wanted to prove.
Further Results
Parametric Auctions with Lazy Reserves
In this section, we present (Corollary 2) an additional immediate consequence of our results to the setting of Azar et al. [2] . Since this is not the main focus of our work, we refer to the above papers, as well as Hartline [32, Ch. 4] for formal definitions. The key components are that we consider a single-dimensional, matroid-constrained environment with n bidders, meaning that the set of feasible allocations forms a matroid over {1, . . . , n}. A class of mechanisms of particular interest are called Lazy-VCG with reserve prices (P 1 , . . . , P n ), where P 1 , . . . , P n are nonnegative random variables. This auction works by first selecting a welfare-maximizing set W of candidate winners (i.e. running a VCG auction) and then offering to an agent i ∈ W a takeit-or-leave-it price sampled according to P i . An important result in this setting is the following black-box reduction from many bidders to one bidder with good performance guarantees (see also 
for constants c 1 , c 2 ∈ [0, 1], then Lazy-VCG with random reserves (P 1 , . . . , P n ) guarantees (in expectation) a As an immediate consequence, since our log-lotteries from Section 4 satisfy the conditions of Theorem 6 with a suitable choice of c 1 , c 2 , we get the following: 
Note that the welfare bounds come "for free" since for any mechanism A ∈ A 1 we have WEL(A; F i ) ≥ REV(A; F i ) and the upper bound in Theorem 2 was derived with respect to VAL(F i ) = µ i .
Regularity vs Dispersion
Note that regularity plays an important role in the previous Corollary 2, as it enables the blackbox reduction of Azar et al. [2] to achieve meaningful upper bounds on the robust approximation ratio for a class of multi-bidder auctions. Given this observation, an obvious question would be whether additional knowledge of regularity can help us design better auctions, even for the single-item, single-bidder setting of Sections 3 and 4. In this section, we consider the notion of λ-regularity, which has already been studied in the context of revenue maximization, e.g. by Schweizer and Szech [50] and Cole and Rao [20] , prove some basic results (Corollary 3) and discuss some interesting implications.
Consider a continuous distribution F supported over an interval D F of nonnegative reals, and a real parameter λ ∈ [0, 1]. Let f denote the density function of F . We will say that F is λ-regular if its λ-generalized virtual valuation function
is monotonically nondecreasing in D F . It is not difficult to see that, for any 0 ≤ λ ≤ λ ≤ 1, any λ-regular distribution is also λ -regular. For the special case of λ = 1, the above definition recovers exactly the standard notion of regularity à la Myerson [45] . On the other extreme of the range, for λ = 0 we get the definition of Monotone Hazard Rate (MHR) distributions. Intuitively, MHR distributions have exponentially decreasing tails. Although they represent the strictest class within the λ-regularity hierarchy, they are still general enough to give rise to a wide family of natural distributions, such as the uniform, exponential, (truncated) normal and gamma.
We will also need the following auxiliary results for λ-regular distributions, which follow from Propositions 2 and 4, and their corresponding proofs, of [50] . (b) Description of our proposed single-item, single-bidder mechanism under knowledge of (µ, σ, λ). Note that λ < 1/2 already implies an upper bound on the coefficient of variation σ/µ (black curve). Moreover, if σ/µ is sufficiently small (in particular, smaller than the function of λ given by the red curve), then offering a lottery over prices (blue area) guarantees a better approximation ratio than simply pricing at the mean (yellow area).
Proposition 3 (Schweizer and Szech [50]).
1. Let F be λ-regular for some λ ∈ [0, 1). Then F has a finite mean, say µ, and we have the inequality
2. Let F be λ-regular for some λ ∈ [0, 1/2). Then F has a finite variance, say σ 2 , and we have the inequality
Now we can state our main result in this section: Proof. Using an upper bound of µ on the revenue of an optimal auction, and the lower bound on the selling probability given by Proposition 3, the result immediately follows as
Note that Corollary 3 gives an upper bound that degrades from e at λ = 0 (MHR), to ∞ at λ = 1 (regular); see Fig. 3a for a plot of this quantity. Next, we compare this ratio against the logarithmic ratio from Theorem 2. In other words, consider a model in which the bidder has information about three quantities of the distribution F : its mean µ, an upper bound of σ 2 on its variance, and an upper bound of λ on its "regularity". Combining our results so far, we can postulate a selling strategy, summarized in Fig. 3b . The first observation is that some triples (µ, σ, λ) are infeasible in the following sense: if the seller knows an upper bound on λ, and furthermore λ < 1/2, then this immediately implies an upper bound on the coefficient of variation by Proposition 3; in particular, the seller would know that σ/µ ≤ 1/(1 − 2λ). Thus, we can assume without loss that triple (µ, σ, λ) obeys this inequality.
Next, we compare the robust approximation ratios of our two candidate strategies, to determine when the log-lottery of Definition 2 outperforms the pricing-at-the-mean from Corollary 3. This amounts to solving the inequality
Since ρ is strictly increasing, this is equivalent to
where for the last equality we simply rewrote the equation in Definition 1 in terms of r. The conclusion is that the upper bound for the log-lottery is better than the upper bound for pricingat-the-mean iff σ/µ is below a certain cutoff point (which depends on λ). Note that Fig. 3b does not show the actual approximation ratio, but rather it partitions the (λ, σ/µ)-space into regions where (the approximation guarantee of) each mechanism is better.
Some additional observations about Fig. 3b are in order. First, in the limit λ → 1, our best guarantee comes from offering the log-lottery mechanism (i.e. knowledge of 1-regularity does not improve the currently best known approximation guarantees for a single-item and a singlebidder); secondly, there is a value of σ/µ, approximately equal to 0.61, below which offering the log-lottery mechanism achieves a better guarantee than that provided by pricing-at-the-mean, regardless of the regularity parameter λ ∈ [0, 1]. Intuitively, one could say that knowing that the standard deviation of F is at most 61% its mean gives better revenue guarantees than knowing that F is MHR, at least for single-item, single-bidder settings.
Discussion and Future Directions
In this paper, we studied the robust approximation ratio of revenue maximization under minimal statistical information of the bidders' prior distribution on the item valuations. The fundamental quantities of interest turn out to be the coefficients of variation (CV), r j = σ j /µ j , of the marginal distributions. For the single-item, single-bidder case we have completely characterized this ratio for deterministic mechanisms (quadratic in r) and gave asymptotically tight bounds for randomized mechanisms (logarithmic in r). This yields natural upper bounds for the multiitem, single-additive-bidder setting, which are proven to be tight for any choice of the r j . As an interesting consequence, we have observed how our results can be immediately applied to the single-dimensional, multi-bidder setting proposed by Azar et al. [2] , and also made a short digression into a setting in which additional information on the regularity is assumed.
We believe that the general topic of "robust revenue with minimal statistical information" gives rise to many interesting questions and variants; below we propose directions for possible future work.
Approximation ratio vs absolute revenue As we already mentioned in the paper, besides the robust approximation ratio in (3), another quantity of independent interest is that given in (8) :
sup
This can be seen as a "vanilla" notion of robust revenue maximization, and it was considered in Azar and Micali [3] (where they proved maximin optimality for deterministic mechanisms); it was also of central interest in the work by Carrasco et al. [13] .
It is perhaps subjective to ask which, if any, of the two quantities is "better", as both have their merits. From a theoretical perspective, the absolute revenue in (8) is a simpler quantity (e.g. it behaves linearly with respect to convex combinations of mechanisms and distributions) and thus probably easier to extend to other settings; furthermore, it might be more appealing to an economist. On the other hand, the approximation ratio in (3) is "dimensionless" or "scale-free", and arguably rather natural for a computer scientist.
Consider the following thought experiment, that highlights this comparison from a more practical perspective. You are the head of a selling platform and your marketing team offers you two possible selling mechanisms:
• Mechanism A (in expectation) guarantees 10$ on each item for sale, but only 25% of the optimal revenue.
• Mechanism B (in expectation) guarantees 50% of the optimal revenue, but only 5$ on each item for sale.
One possible answer could be that "it (almost) doesn't matter": for single-item randomized mechanisms, we proved that the maximin optimal lottery of Carrasco et al. [13] yields asymptotically the best possible guarantee for the robust approximation ratio. However, it is not at all clear if, in general settings, the maximin optimal auction always achieves a guarantee "similar to" (say, a constant away of) the robust ratio-optimal auction. Providing an answer to the debate above is of course beyond the scope of the present paper. Nevertheless, we briefly presented it here as a potentially stimulating topic for future work and discussion, both from a theoretical and an empirical/behavioural point of view.
Tighter bounds Although the single-item, single-bidder case is almost completely solved, our tight analysis still has an "ε-gap" between the upper (Theorem 2) and lower (Theorem 3) bounds; it would be worth trying to close this gap, either by providing stronger lower bound instances, or by improving the upper bound analysis; similar comments apply to the multi-item, single-bidder setting, where it would be interesting to quantify the finer dependencies of the approximation ratio on various choices of ( µ, σ).
Multiple bidders
We would also like to point out a qualitative change between the manyitems and many-bidders settings, when moving to them from the basic single-bidder, single-item scenario: for a single bidder and many items, the approximation guarantee does not degrade; it is essentially bounded by the approximation guarantee of the "worst" item (see Theorem 4) . For a single item and many bidders, however, even with the assumption of independent, regular distributions, we gain an extra factor of 2 (see Corollary 2), coming from the general black box reduction in Azar et al. [2] . It would be interesting to see if this factor can be dropped (or alternatively, provide stronger lower bounds). We believe that a promising way to attack this question would be to study existing or novel bounds on the coefficient of variation of the maximum order statistic of random variables, which may be of independent interest to statisticians. Of course, the most ambitious extension would be to consider multi-dimensional, multi-bidder settings (a generalization of both our work and that of Azar et al. [2] , Azar and Micali [3] ).
Finally, below we propose alternative, or more general, models of limited statistical information that might be interesting for future work:
Intervals of confidence In some situations, it may be impractical to assume exact knowledge of the mean µ of a distribution; instead, one could assume an estimate on the mean (via historical data), say µ ∈ [µ, µ] or µ ∈ (1 ± ε)µ 0 . It would be interesting to incorporate this type of information to the results presented in the present paper, and study how they affect the approximation guarantees.
Broader classes of value functions
An interesting next case would be to study the setting of, say, a single unit-demand bidder and many items, or perhaps more generally, other valuation models such as constrained additivity or submodularity.
Regularity vs dispersion In Section 6.2, we considered a very simple mechanism (price at the mean) which achieves good performance guarantees for λ-regular distributions. Note that λ was not used for designing the mechanism, but only for its analysis. Could we perhaps use the knowledge of λ to design (possibly randomized) mechanisms with better performance? And could we combine knowledge of λ and σ to design better mechanisms in a non-trivial way?
Higher-order moments Carrasco et al. [13] already looked at a single-item, single-bidder case for the "vanilla" revenue maximization problem (8) under knowledge of the first N moments of the valuation distribution; they characterized the solution in terms of an N -dimensional optimization problem, and briefly described it for the case of N = 3. The most intriguing question in this line of work would be to understand the dependence of the approximation guarantee on the number of moments N and, specifically, whether it converges to optimality and at what rate. In other words, what would be the "moment complexity" of robust revenue maximization?
Next, observe that 1 +
B Proof of Proposition 1
In this proof we refer to multiple points in the paper from Carrasco et al. [13] . The optimal mechanism for (8) is given by the allocation rule (see their Proposition 4)
and the value of the maximin problem (8) is (see end of page 274 5 )
where the values of λ 0 , λ 1 , λ 2 are given by (see (B.4-B.6))
;
(17) Note that, as we explained at the end of Section 2.1, the allocation rule x(v) from (15) can be interpreted as the cdf of a randomization over prices which forms an equivalent mechanism. Moreover, by replacing the values of λ 0 , λ 1 , λ 2 as in (17) we get
which is exactly the log-lottery of Definition 2. Finally, by replacing the values of λ 0 , λ 1 , λ 2 from (17), and the values of µ and σ from (5a),(5b), into (16) , the value of the maximin problem can be greatly simplified to
C Asymptotics of the Mechanism by Azar and Micali [1]
In this section we look at the upper bound proposed in Azar and Micali One can directly check that the expression Since the fraction appearing on the right-hand side takes values between 0 and 2 (forρ ∈ [1, ∞)), this gives us the desired global bounds.
D Yao's Principle for Arbitrary Measures
Lemma 8. Let (X, Σ X , F) and (Y, Σ Y , G) be arbitrary probability spaces, 6 i.e.
• Σ X and Σ Y are σ-algebras over X and Y respectively;
• F and G are probability measures over (X, Σ X ) and (Y, Σ Y ) respectively. . 6 For formal definitions of the measure-theoretic notions used in this lemma see, e.g., Tao [52] . 7 Throughout this lemma, we handle ratios of the form g h where g > 0 and h ≥ 0. For convenience, if h = 0 we interpret the ratio as being equal to ∞. This means that, for any nonnegative real number α, we have the following relation, even when h = 0: E x∼F [h(x, y)]
As α was any real number that satisfies (18) , the desired inequality follows. Clearly, h is nonnegative and g is positive since F θ is (µ, σ)-distributed. We just need to argue that both are measurable. Note that h(p, θ) = REV(p; F θ ) = p(1 − F θ (p−)) = inf y<p p(1 − F (y; θ)).
Lemma (Lemma 3).
As F is measurable and taking extrema preserves measurability, so is h. In a similar way, g is measurable as it can be expressed as the supremum As A and (Θ, F ) were arbitrary, we can take the supremum on the right-hand side over (µ, σ) mixtures, and the infimum on the left-hand side over truthful mechanisms; the result follows.
